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RECENT CASE COMMENTS
tiffs were not involved in the sharp practice. "A court of equity
will not allow itself to become a handmaid of iniquity of any
kind. "9
D. .H.
INJUNCTION - INTERFERENCE WITH ADVANTAGEOUS BUsINss
RELATIONS-SELLING SOLUTIONS IN PUZZLE CONTEST. -Plaintiff
newspaper publisher sought to enjoin defendant, a professional
puzzle solver, from selling his services to contestants in a puzzle
contest which plaintiff had instituted in his paper as a circulation
scheme, offering substantial cash prizes to successful participants.
Defendant's aid to contestants violated a term of the contest which
disqualified all who obtained answers by purchase or exchange.
Held, that defendant's solicitation and sale of answers constituted
an interference with- contracts for which an injunction would issue.
Philadelphia Record Co. v. Leopold.1
It is a truism that one cannot be guilty of inducing a breach
of contract unless a contract exists. Here no contract existed.
There could not be a bilateral contract in which both parties would
be bound,3 for the offeree, being the public, admittedly was under
no duty to perform. Nor was there a unilateral contract for,
until there is the complete performance requested, there can be
no unilateral contract binding the offeror, notwithstanding he may
perhaps be bound to continue his offer after performance is begun,4
nor any breach of such a contract. Hence, defendant was not in-
ducing breach of a contract, as none existed at the time of his inter-
ference; rather he was inducing the offeree to render improper
acceptance of an offer. Indeed, the court, after speaking of in-
ducement to .a breach of contract, withdrew from that position,
• Kreamer v. Earl, 91 Cal. 112, 118, 27 Pac. 735 (1891). See Pollock, The
Highwayman's Case (1893) 9 L. Q. REv. 196, and Riddell, A Legal Scandal
Two Hundreds Years Ago (1930) 16 A. B. A. J. 422, discussing Everet v.
Williams (1725), unreported, where relief was denied a highwayman asking an
accounting against his partner in crime.
140 F. Supp. 346 (S. D. N. Y. 1941).
2 Triangle Film Corp. v. Arteraft Pictures, 250 Fed. 981 (C. C. A. 2d, 1918);
Parker v. Brown, 195 S. C. 35, 10 S. E. (2d) 625 (1940); see Walker v.
Cronin, 107 Mass. 555, 563 (1871).
3 1 Wi ,IsTON, CONTRACTS (Rev. ed. 1936) § 13.
4 RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (1932) § 45; see Dyer v. Duffy, 39 W. Va. 148,
1.54, 10 S. E. 540, 543 (1894). The doctrine of mutuality of obligation does
not apply to unilateral contracts. Cf. Railsback v. Raines, 110 Kan. 220, 203
Pac. 687 (1922). But there is a right to have a unilateral contract protected
from malicious interference even though it imposes a duty on the offeror only.
Moran v. Dunphy, 117 Mass. 485, 59 N. E. 125 (1901).
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saying: "The problem is complicated by the fact that the offerec
was under noj duty to perform. It may be questioned whether in
such case one can be guilty of inducing a breach of contract on the
part of the offeree. However, defendants are clearly inducing con-
testants to tender spurious performance."5
The court seemed sensible that a wrong was being done and
seized the most convenient label, namely inducing breach of con-
tract, to classify it. Had a contract existed, it is settled since
Lumley v. Gye,0 that third persons might be enjoined from inducing
its breach. " That the contract is terminable at will," or is for no
fiLxed period,9 is immaterial.
But since no contract existed, it is submitted that the court
should not have spoken in terms of inducing a breach. Better
potential grounds for the injunction were available. The right to
carry on a lawful business is a right of substance and may be pro-
tected by injunction from unwarranted interference.10 While the
social and economic utility of such promotional schemes may be
questioned, their widespread use argues for their recognition as a
lawful means of carrying on business. If so regarded, defendant's
conduct was an unwarranted interference with it. Plaintiff's 1pri-
mary concern in all likelihood was to protect his circulation scheme
5 40 F. Supp. 346, 348 (S. D. N. Y. 1941).
0 2 E. & B. 216 (Q. B. 1853). This case first established the principle.
Aff'cZ in Bowen v. Hall, 6 Q. B. 333 (1881), it has expanded from contracts
for personal services to include most lawful contracts. The principal case
wrongly cites Lumley v. Wagner, 1 DeG. M. & G. 604 (1852), instead of Lum-
ley v. Gye, perhaps through a clerical error.
7 Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33, 36 S. Ct. 7, 60 L. Ed. 131 (1915); Parker
Paint & Wall Paper Co. v. Local Union No. 813, 87 W. Va. 631, 105 S. E. 911
(1921). Damages will lie for inducing breach of contract, Hornstein v.
Podwitz, 254 N. Y. 443, 173 N. E. 674 (1930); Sayre, Inducing Breach of Con-
tract (1923) 36 HAaV. L. REV. 663; Carpenter, Interference with Contract
Relations (1928) 41 HIAv. L. REv. 728; of. Comerford v. Meier, 302 Mass.
398, 19 N. E. (2d) 711 (1939). Injunction will lie against third person from
inducing breach of contract when done wantonly and maliciously and whether
for defendant's own benefit or not. Test Virginia Transportation Co. v.
Standard Oil Co., 50 W. Va. 611, 40 S. E. 591 (1902); Thacker Coal Co. v.
Burke, 59 W. Va. 253, 53 S. E. 161 (1906).
8 Patterson Glass Co. v. Thomas, 41 Cal. App. 559, 183 Pac. 190 (1919) ; see
Tubular Rivet & Stud Co. v. Exeter Boot & Shoe Co., 159 Fed. 824, 829 (C. 0.
A. 1st, 1908); Thacker Coal Co. v. Burke, 59 AV. Va. 253, 258, 53 S. E. 161,
163 (1906).
0 Bausch & Lomb Optical Co. v. Wahlgren, 1 F. Supp. 799 (N. D. 1ll. 1932),
afIf'd 68 F. (2d) 660 (C. C. A. 7th, 1934); Frank v. Herold, 63 N. J. Eq. 443,
52 Ati. 152 (1901). Contra: Boston Glass Manufactory v. Binney, 21 Mass.
425 (1827).
10 Paramount Pictures, Inc. v. Leader Press, Inc., 106 F. (2d) 229 (C. C. A.
10th, 1939); Saxon Motor Sales, Inc. v. Torino, 166 Misc. 863, 2 . Y. S.
(2d) 885 (1938).
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from the impairment consequent upon the public suspicion that
purchased answers were being submitted.
Unprivileged interference with negotiations reasonably calcu-
lated to result in contracts beneficial to others," or inducing third
persons to refrain from the formation of contracts, when accom-
panied by legal malice" is tortious. Damages being inadequate
and uncertain, equity might well feel moved to exercise its dis-
cretion to issue an injunction to prevent loss potentially conse-
quent upon disappointment of reasonable anticipations.
Is there also present tortious fraud and deceit whose commis-
sion equity might enjoin? The Restatement5 recognizes liability
in damages for substantially assisting another in committing a tort
upon a third person. Defendant's conduct in the instant case may
conceivably be deemed a participation in deceit 4 by aiding con-
testants to submit prepared solutions on an implied false repre-
sentation of their originality. If that is a tort, the difficulty of
identifying the contestants joining in it argues for allowance of an
injunction to stop the wrong at its root, which damages cannot do.
While the reasoning in the instant case is questionable, the
result seems fair. Instinctively feeling that defendant's conduct
inequitably prejudiced plaintiff's rights, the court apparently tried
to accommodate it to existing concepts without critical analysis of
alternative grounds or creative development of new ones.
M. S. K.
INSURANCE - CASH-SURRENDER VALUE MUTUAL ISTAIE.-
P formerly held a policy of war risk insurance, which he later con-
verted into a $10,000 twenty-payment life policy. The latter policy
provided for payment to the insured of $57.50 per month upon due
proof that he had become totally and permanently disabled while
the policy was in force. The policy also contained a provision to
the effect that upon written request therefor by the insured made
11 HARPER, TORTS (1933) § 231; Lewis v. Bloede, 202 Fed. 7 (C. C. A. 4th,
1912); Union Car Advertising Co., Inc. v. Collier, 232 App. Div. 591, 251 N. Y.
Supp. 153 (1931); Tarleton v. M'Gawley, Peake 205 (N. P. 1804).
12 62 C. J. 1137, § 53.
13 "For harm resulting to a third person from the tortious conduct of an-
other, a person is liable if he . . . (b) knows that the other's conduct consti-
tutes a breach of duty and gives substantial assistance . . . to the other so to
conduct himself . . ." RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1939) § 876, comment b.
14 Deceit is a false representation, fraudulently made, under circumstances
on which the plaintiff is entitled to rely if the plaintiff relies thereon to his
damage. HARPER, ToRs § 217.
3
K.: Injunction--Interference with Advantageous Business Relations--Se
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1942
